DOI: https://doi.org/10.56712/latam.v6i2.3685
An essay on participation and political consciousn=
ess
Un ensayo sobre la participació=
;n y
la conciencia política
Karen Cronick
karen.cronick@gmail.com<=
span
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:Roboto;mso-fareast-font-family:Roboto;
mso-bidi-font-family:Roboto;mso-ansi-language:EN-US'>
https://orcid.org/=
0000-0002-1009-6873
Psychology Institute, Central
University of Venezuela
Caracas
– Venezuela
Artículo
recibido: 06 de febrero de 2025. Aceptado para publicación: 27 de ma=
rzo
de 2025.
Conflictos de
Interés: Ninguno que declarar.
Abstract
The main objective of this essay is to review how community and citi=
zen
participation can facilitate the development of democracy, and limit the po=
wer
of tyrannical systems. In the following pages I have examined the concept of
participation as described in psychological and philosophical literature in
order to demonstrate how open debates regarding communities’ normative
values can mobilize efforts to create more inclusive and engaged cultures in
groups, societies and governments. I illustrate how this process happens and
give theoretical arguments for promoting it.
Keywords: democracy,
dictatorship, culture, consciousness, social change
Resumen
El
objetivo principal de este ensayo es revisar cómo la
participación comunitaria y ciudadana pueden facilitar el desarrollo=
de
sistemas más democráticos, y poner límites al poder de=
los
regímenes tiránicos. En las siguientes páginas he revi=
sado
literatura psicológica y filosófica con el fin de demostrar
cómo los debates abiertos sobre los valores normativos de las
comunidades pueden movilizar esfuerzos para crear culturas más
inclusivas y comprometidas en grupos, sociedades y gobiernos. Aclaró
cómo este proceso ocurre, y ofreció argumentos teórico=
s a
favor de su promoción.
Palabras clave: democracia, dictadura, cultura, concien=
cia,
cambio social
Todo el contenido
de LATAM Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades,
publicado en este sitio está disponibles bajo Licencia <=
span
lang=3DES style=3D'color:black;mso-color-alt:windowtext'>Creative Commons.
Cómo citar: Cronick, K.
(2025). An essay
INTRODUCTION
Community and social psychology are essenti=
ally
political disciplines, in the sense that they investigate -and promote-
ideational and structural changes in community groups that favor local
wellbeing and participation. Often studies in these disciplines deal with t=
he
results of social experiments, opinion studies or other projects that
professionals in the area have carried out. One of the major tools used in
community interventions is to increase neighborhood participation.
It is important to reflect on the theoretic=
al
aspects of neighborhood and citizen participation. It can happen as a resul=
t of
professional intervention, but it can also be the outcome of
“naturally” occurring processes. Even when it originates in the
relatively spontaneous movements of concerned citizens, it is important for
professionals who are active in community work to understand the dynamics of
these events.
In this essay I have considered the role of
culture in fomenting participation. While it is possible to “create
culture” in a community intervention, it is important to understand
naturally occurring beliefs and customs in order to help people redress
injustices or correct damaging practices. It is also important to understand
the term “consciousness” in the sense of the awareness that peo=
ple
have of their place in the world, their aspirations for change, and their
possibilities of achieving it.
I have reviewed certain conceptions that
describe how culture works in this way, and its relationship to consciousne=
ss
and participation, together with the manifestation of contradictory values =
such
as domination and competition. Participation can be defined as taking part =
in,
or being involved in something. It can be a component in organized human
activities that rely on the voluntary contributions of many people such as =
in
war, voting systems, pension plans, and collaborations in collective endeav=
ors
like charity activities. In smaller groups participation happens, for examp=
le,
in community meetings, friendly encounters, musical and theatrical producti=
ons.
and family celebrations. The word can also refer to smaller collaborations
between two or more individuals.
In the following pages I have reviewed: a)
participation as described by George Simmel (2016) in which people’s
multiple allegiances -even in conditions of political domination- can be a
resource for liberation efforts, b) the nature of normative values from Kan=
t to
Habermas, including the possibility of a hierarchy of values, or cultural
relativity, c) culture and the lifeworld as a social environment, and d) the
relationship of all these concepts to the possibility of a participative
government.
DEVELOPMENT
Participation,
competition and dominance
To understand participation, it is important
first to review the influences that hinder its development. We have just
developed a broad definition of the term that includes both large group
endeavors and small face-to-face experiences. It is possible that in a given
system or culture that large-scale participative actions are repressed, whi=
le
small-scale interactions are encouraged. Also, in modern political environm=
ents
that prohibit dissident participation, public acts of political support for=
the
existing regimen are encouraged and even fabricated.
The subjected individual sometimes seeks a
higher authority to protect them. But on the other hand, people also resist
this power. Thus, for Simmel, "obedience and opposition constitute two
aspects of the same conduct» (Simmel, p. 214). Simmel considered that
this duality in power relationships extends from large-scale political
references, to work environments, to marital relations, and even to the
relationships between children and their parents.
Simmel referred to a "differentiated
spiritual structure". This structure is important for understanding the
contradiction between submission and liberation, because there are some
elements that are susceptible to domination and others that are not.
Simmel even
referred to the bureaucrat’s (or the employee’s) submission to =
his
or her agency or company. When the individual subject “disappearsR=
21;
into a collectivity that lacks subjective states of mind, they may facilita=
te
power abuses, because it is difficult for compassion and kindness to be
manifested in situations of dominance (Zabludovsky
& Sabido, p. 44). But peo=
ple
have principles or a sense of responsibility as well. And even when majorities are forme=
d,
there can be “active minorities."[1] That is, when
majorities are formed by voting processes or other mechanisms, minorities c=
an
survive. We remember that Simmel was writing shortly before the success of =
the
German fascist movement.
People can also be subordinated to an impersonal and objective principle. This reminds us of Émile Durkheim (1999) or Eric Fromm’s (1959) use of the word “obedience”. These principles can emerge from an individual´s internal dialogue, a= nd one can “obey” a principle, or a religious precept. In Simmel’s work this refers to principles like the rule of law. It can refer to an imperative and moral conscience, almost in the sense developed = by Emmanuel Kant (2012). Simmel says that “once normative forms have tak= en hold […] they are liberated from their primitive sociological supports” (p. 196). People then adopt them, and they begin to represe= nt “needs that we call ‘ideal needs’” (p. 196). These needs can be emancipatory. <= o:p>
Simmel also refers to the mutual relations
between distinct dominated groups or individuals, as in collective agreemen=
ts.
We can think of the relationships between employees in a company, union mem=
bers
or even countries (as in the formation of the European Union after their
experience with German domination in the 1930’s<=
/span>
and 1940’s).
These relationships can be liberating when =
the
organizations express emancipating principles, but can also increase the
subordination of their members when their leaders have political agendas wi=
th
regard to their own potential aspirations.
Simmel points out that one of the most powe=
rful
strategies for retaining power is for the tyrant to share enemies with the
dominated class. For this reason, xenophobia has often been used as a polit=
ical
lure or “bait” to attract followers.
Culture and the
"lifeworld"
"Culture" is the favorite topic of
anthropologists and sociologists. As a general rule, anthropology studies s=
mall
communities, often tribal and isolated groups. Sociology, on the other hand,
tends to analyze large institutions with the aim of making social trends and
structures visible. In the reflections that follow, I will concentrate on t=
he
idea of culture as a social-political environment.
Martínez, Bermudez, Cediel,
& Beltran (2022), in an article on the role of culture in the economic =
and
political development of nations, say that it has a fundamental role in the
creation of well-being and the full participation of citizens in the proces=
ses
of their state. They point out how the United Nations, together with the Un=
ited
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), are
promoting culture as one of the pivots of development, within the framework=
of
fundamental freedoms. They say that culture strengthens political
participation, invigorates social solidarity and cooperation, refines value
formation, and strengthens people´s understanding of their historical
heritage. The authors offer various definitions of culture, such as a compl=
ex
whole that expresses the life of a given human group, and also as a
“textile of meanings”. In their third definition, it is a means=
of
social transformation that includes Nation-States, local communities and
different social actors in decision-making.
The authors say that "culture is expre=
ssed
as artistic creation and reference, identity, education, patterns of conduc=
t,
life models, social representation, symbols, values and practice, as well a=
s an
element of power". The role of the individual is to “recreate=
221;
the meaning of the world and of his or her own existence, always within the
framework of their cultural history.
This approach to culture incorporates the i=
deas
of intentional and contemplative change in favor of humanistic values. It d=
oes
not abandon the idea of tradition, but puts it at the service of the well-b=
eing
of all members of society. Even in countries where leaders have used cultur=
al
aspects to strengthen their own power, cultural diversity allows people to
question old practices. In South Africa, for example, apartheid was challen=
ged
by members of both the white and black populations, and eventually Nelson
Mandela became the nation's first black president. Both he and the previous (white)
president, Frederik de Klerk, shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993 for their
efforts, which were backed by an immense collective effort.
Common Sense
Common sense is usually defined in contrast=
to
scientific knowledge (Moscovici, 1961/1976; Lévi Strauss, 1959/1987).
For their part, Moscovici & Hewstone (1984)
distinguished between automatic and critical thinking. Montero (1994) has compared the two
types of knowledge, finding that between them "there is a continuous
interrelationship" (p. 14). She says that "they are two contexts =
of
knowledge production" (p. 14) and represent attempts to make sense of =
the
world through language.
Perelman & Olbrech=
ts-Tyteca
(1989. p. 168) define common sense as "a series of beliefs accepted wi=
thin
a given society, whose members assume that any reasonable being shares
them." This definition points to the validity of these beliefs, in the
sense that acceptance by "everyone" allows the content of given
cultural agreements to be declared correct, appropriate or acceptable. Ther=
e is
in this formulation a faith in the correspondence between objects and thoug=
ht:
the red of the rose is in the rose and "everyone reasonable&q=
uot;
who has the use of his eyes would agree. Similarly, people "know"
what they should do or not do, what produces pleasure and what causes sadne=
ss.
It is common sense that places community members as points of reference in a
system that assigns social meaning to individual perceptions and actions, a=
nd
provides the criteria for judging them.
On the other hand, the existence of these
criteria does not imply the absence of discrepancies. Billig=
et al
(1988) state that common sense consists of statements that occur in opposit=
es,
that is, a menu of possible positions and options that exist within popular
knowledge in an abstract way, which can be applied in concrete conditions
according to people’s intentions. They are sometimes conflicting. Peo=
ple
deliberate with others and even with themselves about ethical, legal and, in
general, dilemmatic issues, and they do so within the structural axes of th=
eir
culture. This appreciation echoes Simmel´s idea of cultural diversity=
.
The plausibilit=
y of
values and cognitions
The definitions given by Perelman &
Arguments in fa=
vor
of the hierarchization of values and cognitions
Many cognitions can be subjected to criteri=
a to
judge their plausibility ("that cat is black, not white"), but wh=
en
cognitions contain value judgments, they are open to discussion, and there =
are
historically elaborated criteria for judging them. These are agreements or
social constructions that structure value judgments; One of these criteria =
has
to do with the benevolence of certain social practices. Examples include: a)
tolerance is better than racial and ethnic prejudice; b) respect for human
rights is better than the use of torture and other humiliating means of
punishment; and c) it is better to protect children than to leave them
helpless.
Both values and cognitions can be subjected=
to
acceptability criteria in these terms. =
; &n=
bsp; =
; Savater (1986), applying criteria of rationality to e=
thics,
uses the word "meaning" as a criterion that transcends cognitions=
and
values; meaning would be a higher category that contextualizes the actions =
and
subjectivity of human groups. Meaning would be a collective fund of knowled=
ge
about what is good, effective and in general, in use or accepted in their
cultures. Ethics would be: "... a rational attempt to give a totalizing
sense to human actions... [Ethics] does not consist in asking whether this =
or
that particular behavior is 'good' or 'bad', nor what I should do at any gi=
ven
moment, but rather: what is the meaning of my deliberation and my choice?&q=
uot;
(Savater, 1986, p. 11).
Defined in this way, ethics consists of mor=
e or
less coherent systems of thought, that is: "... a normative claim of
knowledge... rationally articulated... (which) tries to make rationally
intelligible what the human subject as such, in the end, wants." (Savater, 1986, p. 11)
Its elements can be classified as valid, or
invalid, within the context of which they are part. The last element, volit=
ion
(what the subject wants), cannot be subjected to these judgments, but the
intentions and acts with which they are associated can be judged in terms of
the normative body of cultural knowledge.
Habermas (1987/1992, p. 72), on the other h=
and,
distinguishes between several types of validity criteria: a) the validity of
the objective world, to which criteria of truth and falsehood can be applie=
d,
or propositional truth, b) normative rectitude, which, although defined by
"current" cultural criteria, can be rationally criticized, and c)
expressive veracity which can be summarized as subjective sincerity.
Habermas says that rationality has less to =
do
with knowledge than with the way in which subjects capable of language and
action make use of it (Habermas, 1992, p. 24). For Habermas, rationality mu=
st
embody "a fallible knowledge" (p. 26) and must also be "a
disposition of subjects capable of language and action" (p. 42).
In this sense, we can say that there is a b=
asis
for: a) applying criteria of plausibility to values and subjectivity, as we=
ll
as to cognitions, and b) hierarchizing the lifeworlds<=
/span>
or cultures in terms of said validity. This is true especially because ther=
e may
be in a given culture opposing value systems that at the same time may defe=
nd
both tolerance and xenophobic and repressive standards. People eventually m=
ust
defend their norms.
We can postulate that the creation of
plausibility criteria for judging cognitions and values can be achieved thr=
ough
argumentation; that is, the criteria of acceptability are historically
elaborated through persuasion. The distinction made by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1989) between the acts of persuadin=
g and
convincing will be useful to illustrate the difference and similarity betwe=
en:
a) local and temporal values and cognitions, i.e., those that are actively
debated and that have supporters and opponents, and b) values and cognitions
that could be postulated at some point as absolute in the Kantian sense, th=
at
is, those that are universally and a priori valid for all people. These aut=
hors
say that persuasive arguments "are only intended to serve a particular
audience" (p. 67) insofar as the verb "persuade" refers to a
particular situation in which it is possible to give reasons for the adopti=
on
of a belief, a value or an attitude.
On the other hand, convincing arguments can obtain "the adhesio=
n of
every entity of reason" (Perelman, & Olbrecht=
s-Tyteca,
1989, p. 67).
We can doubt the "real" existence=
of
universal values and convincing arguments. But for each particular audience
there are bases for "problematizing" (in Freire's sense)[2] about each
category of values and cognitions. This supposes an underlying communality =
to
the human condition. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca
(1989, p. 69) say that "from the moment it is accepted that there are
means of proof other than the necessary proof, the argumentation that is
addressed to particular audiences has a scope that goes beyond the merely
subjective belief". Argumentation that is directed at the production of
"non-appreciative reasons" (i.e., reasons that are not bound by
pressure, the use of power, and coercion) is the vehicle for particular
audiences to reach agreements with each other about the hierarchies they wi=
ll
establish between their values and the plausibility of their cognitions.
The relationship
between truth and plausibility
The true and the plausible are established =
in
terms of some body of reference. "Truth" exists in more or less
closed systems such as axiomatic mathematics or a body of legal proscriptio=
ns
where a person can be declared guilty or innocent. However, mathematical and
legal "truth" can be distinguished from each other. Although in
mathematics the truth can be proven in the inductive sense if there is no
counterexample, and deductively if there is proof, in the law there are deg=
rees
of guilt, and binding decisions can be modified. Legislation can even change
the criteria for establishing the "truth", according to the value=
s of
the people who make up the society where the laws are in force. In a similar
sense, plausibility is historically constructed in common sense, not as in
progress or evolutionary structures, but cumulatively in the sense of what =
is
acceptable or the best option. When a conflict occurs between two plausible
solutions, the resolution of differences occurs through debate.
However, in general there are many
"almost" established solutions. For example, one of the highest
possible values since World War II is the condemnation of human rights
violations. Also, democracy has been an "invention" of common sen=
se
(which has since been formally elaborated) that regulates individual
confrontations. In this way, we can say that democracy "is" better
than tyranny, but at the same time there remains the possibility that other
forms of consultation and control are also possible.
Relativity
The results of community problematization a=
nd
awareness can be considered relative. Rappaport (1977), for example, in his
classic book, Community Psychology, has chapters devoted to the analysis of
some traditional concepts of clinical psychology, including intelligence,
mental health, statistical normality, and social deviance. In relation to t=
hese
concepts, the author considers certain political and ethnocentric implicati=
ons
related to the imposition of values by dominant sectors of North American
society. He proposes that one way to deal with these implications is throug=
h a
relativistic position, where social change would be the product of the
problematization of the felt needs of a specific social group, which are
contextualized historically. This means that the social reality of one grou=
p is
not transferable to other groups and cannot be imposed by an external agent=
of
change. Problematization, in this sense, occurs at the level of individual
communities when they "become aware" of both their needs and
appropriate ways to satisfy them.
Rappaport questions the right of psychologists to establish their own
criteria about what is healthy, normal, correct and good, outside the conte=
xt
of particular groups, precisely because of the political influence suffered=
by
these professionals.
However, I consider that the relativity of
cognitions and values is a weak solution to the problem of the multiplicity=
of
values and cognitions. I propose the possibility of replacing it with the
notion of pragmatic and limited tolerance. This would include a
community’s (or an individual’s) acknowledgment of normative
differences within given limits. Thus, people can accept the existence of
different religions, but reject the idea of gender discrimination.
The Lifeworld and social change: The idea of
"lifeworld" is closely related to that of culture. It is importan=
t to
review the two notions because they incorporate the possibility of critical
consciousness in groups and individuals. The lifeworld is an original conce=
pt
of Husserl that was later developed by Alfred Schutz and others in which the
phenomenon of common sense inserted in a given culture is examined. Ricardo
Salas (2006) summarizes Schutz saying that people presuppose that their fel=
low
beings have conscious life and that intercommunication is possible. (Salas,=
p.
172). And then Salas describes the life-world as an accumulation of knowled=
ge
transmitted between people of a given social group. In this way, one’s
knowledge about the natural world can be contrasted with their knowledge of=
the
"significant world", that implies an implicit reference to the
"Other". (Salas, p. 174).
In Cronick (
Consciousness We may need to consider that
consciousness is a cultural phenomenon, not in the sense of a mental capaci=
ty,
but rather in terms of self-perception. The way people perceive themselves
makes a difference in what possibilities they see for themselves and others=
. This
self-perception has cultural roots and has influenced humanity’s ways=
of
relating to the world and to others, and has had a profound political
impact.
Juan Manuel Navarro in his introduction to
Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1996) quotes Hegel who
said that self-consciousness, as described by Descartes, is an essential mo=
ment
of truth for modern thinking. It was the beginning of the “principle =
of
immanence", in which philosophy’s attention switched from “=
;the
object to the subject, from the world to the self, from the exterior to the
interior” (p. 8). Meditation about objects becomes a meditation about=
the
essence of “what is”, in this case, an appreciation that arises
from the thoughts of a being who is thinking.
In his fifth rule, Descartes (1996) talked
about the need to substitute ontological reflections (in the scholastic sen=
se)
for epistemological ones, which, although objective (scientifically speakin=
g)
implies subjective criteria (Navarro 1996, p. 21), or, at least a conscious=
decision
to decide to think in one particular way and reject others. Method underlies
Descartes’ philosophy. Given that the method is chosen by the thinker=
, it
determines de direction of his thoughts.&n=
bsp;
In Descartes, the method is a requirement for the critical spirit wh=
o is
confronting his or her own cultural and historical legacy. The method is not
something merely procedural, but rather is an intimate motivation and an
anthropological demand. What is questioned is the self itself, and therefore
the method gives rise to the birth of "secularized man" (p. 26). =
This
has important implications for modern-day political and ethical reflections,
because they should be accompanied by more than feel-good emotions. They al=
so
require a conscious, methodological backup.
In John Locke we find reflections, not only
about how conscious thought leads to a true appreciation of reality as
conceived by a conscious mind, but also the mechanics of thought and
self-awareness. Gideon Yaffe (2011) has analyzed
Locke’s approach to consciousness. Consciousness and awareness can be
distinguished from sensory perception. Perception is an appreciation of what
goes on in the world according to one´s visual and auditory appreciat=
ion.
Consciousness, however, is directed inward. As Locke puts it, “[c]
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (20=
24)
refers to how Kant enlarged on these reflections. The authors tell us that
Kant’s idea of phenomenal consciousness is not a mere succession of a=
ssociated
ideas, but rather a reflection on the experience of a conscious self, situa=
ted
in an objective world, and structured with respect to space, time and
causality. This observation is crucial for the growing awareness among
Illustration philosophers about the role of responsiveness in the developme=
nt
of man’s role in determining political awareness.
Truth and ethic=
s
It is interesting how, in popular language,
ethics is linked to the idea of "what is true". Daniel Figuera (2025) refers to Alain B=
adiou’s
idea of social truth. For Badiou, truth is not a
static fact or a universal revelation. It is a cultural recognition of a new
way of defining what is true. A new process or "event" introduces=
a
new logic within a given system. There are plural "truths" that
necessarily have to be partial and linked to specific contexts. He gives as
examples the current ideas on climate change or economic inequalities. Gene=
ral
conceptual structures would then be built through participation.
However, one of the characteristics of trut=
h,
for a very long time, has been that it has to be based on rules that determ=
ine
its acceptability. One of these basic rules, as I have been saying, is that=
any
statement must be accompanied by an awareness of the method used to establi=
sh
it.
To establish the truth in scenarios such as
historical accounts or legal testimonies there are also rules. There must be
previous writings or stories that sustain them in order to be labeled as
truths. In this sense, an account, such as Homer’s description of the
Trojan war, drawn up before the historical period of written records, is not
the same as the stories recorded by identifiable authors. And even in the
latter case, the stories must be subject to analysis and verification. We c=
an
ask, for example, about the total veracity of Plutarch's Parallel Lives. In=
the
same way we can critically analyze modern narratives. Thus, people can lear=
n to
require “evidence” to support a politician, or a sect leader- f=
or
claims about the supposed risks posed by vaccinations, or xenophobic
accusations.
Freedom or
lordship: military and other human bonds
For as long as there has been historical
evidence, kings have exercised exclusive power, and have attempted to conqu=
er
nearby realms, enlarging their own territories or creating colonies. There =
is
evidence that human beings were not always like this. In fact, in their book
"The Dawn of Everything", Graeber and Wenfro=
w
(2021) state that in the first millennia of human history, human groups
exhibited cooperative and deliberative behaviors. This collective
decision-making was not limited to tribal life; according to these two auth=
ors,
some very large settlements were governed by these principles.
It was only in the last four or five millen=
nia
that kings, conquerors and dictators have dominated the human experience. T=
his
period covers almost all documented history. For as long as we have histori=
cal
references, there have been colonialists and monarchs who have imposed their
authority by force.
Once in power, the acquisition of new
territories was not only attractive among the kings, but also a requirement=
for
their survival. When Agamemnon went to conquer Troy, and when Alexander the
Great ended Athenian democracy, they obeyed the same cultural mandates that=
the
European colonizers followed in Africa and the Americas. It was a similar
mandate when the Germans launched a major war to increase their
"lebensraum" and Russia and the United States invaded Afghanistan=
in
turn. Still today, tyrants try to claim whole territories and their inhabit=
ants
as their own.
These military endeavors required the
participation of people from the less advantaged classes. There were implic=
it
benefits to following orders. Soldiers could often merit certain privileges,
and even profit from the plunder of war. Later, as in the case of
Napoleon’s armies, the generals might recur to the nationalistic
loyalties to motivate their soldiers.[3]
The “Band=
s of
Brothers” in military life
In terms of military bonds, “Warrior
ideologies”[4] appear in
literature, from the ancient Greek phalanx’ shoulder-to-shoulder
hoplites, to Shakespeare’s “band of brothers”[5] to Cotton̵=
7;s
(2017) description of the relationship between United States’ soldier=
s in
Afghanistan. Cotton talks about a masculine “warrior ideology”<=
/span>[6] in which ̶=
0;in
combat, your motives don’t matter really. […] As bad as it soun=
ds,
you don’t fight for what you believe in. You fight for the person nex=
t to
you” (Eiden, n.d., cited by Cotton, p 23)=
.
Thus, war contains its own kind of
participation. It is important to understand these bonds in order to formul=
ate
alternative ways of relating. It is also important to understand the appeal
that war can have for certain cultures and their members.
Tribal cooperat=
ion
In traditional, tribal communities, personal
relationships are based on kinship and age-hierarchies. Decisions are often
reached collectively with especial respect given to “chiefs” and
elders. Tasks like hunting, food gathering and house-building are often
undertaken specifically by women, men or almost-grown children, and these a=
re
traditional activities. There are also intertribal collaborations that Justo
(2024) describes as: “… alliances, forged bonds of friendship, =
and
engaged in collaborative efforts that have shaped the very fabric of human
civilization. From the ancient confederacies of Native American tribes in N=
orth
America to the cooperative ventures among African kingdoms […]”=
.
Participative
government
Monarchy, oligarchy, and dictatorships have
been the predominant kinds of governmental systems in historical times. In
general, they concentrate the power of decision and action among few
individuals, and usually have strong military components. We will not
concentrate our attention on these systems, because in this section we are
interested in two ideas with respect to government: a) where does the
initiative for increased citizen participation come from? And b) how does
massive political participation work?
The promoters of change tend to surge from =
the
ideas of artists, playwrights, writers, philosophers and intellectuals in
general, who at certain critical moments in history have made proposals for
social transformation. Likewise, philosophers and poets paved the way for
European and American democracy in the eighteenth century. The origin of th=
ese
movements had a long preparation, that began with the Renaissance (fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries), and continued with the Enlightenment in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In these times authors, artists,
scientists, and philosophers (who were not in power) such as William
Shakespeare, Leonardo da Vinci, Nicolaus Copernicus, Sir Francis Bacon,
René Descartes, and later, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, Voltaire,
Rousseau, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Thomas Hobbes, Denis Diderot and A=
dam Smith
debated each other in the publications, theaters and meeting houses of their
time. Each proclaimed his particular perspective. These people did not need=
to
agree, the important thing was their shared discussion.
We can cite poetic and theatrical sources f=
rom
very long ago. The tradition continues, with modern authors, who, while not
political leaders, helped elaborate the lifeworlds of
their times, for example, Victor Hugo, Mark Twain, Henrik Ibsen, Bertolt
Brecht, George Orwell, John Steinbeck, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Harper Lee,
Gabriel García Márquez, Salman Rushdie, and Langston Hughes a=
mong
many, many others.
Within the power structures of centralized
systems, it would be very rare for dictators to propose a participative sys=
tem,
except as a subterfuge for concentrating even more power in fewer hands. Th=
ey
might propose elections, but usually they would have control over the resul=
ts.
Normally, the changes initiated from a profound cultural level have to do w=
ith
the need increase the well-being of the great majorities. Intellectual
dissidents (such as the active minorities -Moscovici 1996)[7], groups such as
non-governmental organizations, ad hoc committees and other similar
organizations, pick up the call for change.
In other words, free debate, far from causi=
ng
havoc and chaos, produces critical thinking that empowers people of all ran=
ks.
It would be better if the whole population were literate, but at many criti=
cal
moments in history, few could read. It was enough for the information to co=
me
through word of mouth from of those who could understand the written word. =
We rely on national and international
organizations, congresses and parliaments, political parties, businesses, a=
nd
other organizations to solve our social problems. However, it is becoming m=
ore
and more evident that the only organizations that are going to "save&q=
uot;
us are those that promote widespread reflections about who we are and what =
we
wish to become. One example would be renovated and critical education syste=
ms
and another would be non-governmental organizations such as "Care for
Peace", "Save the Children", "Doctors without Borders&q=
uot;
and others that offer relief and reflection in emergency situations. We have
mentioned dissident authors. We have to evaluate our true needs, and recons=
ider
what our most transcendental values are. And we have to do it as interconne=
cted
collectivities. It has to be an explicit and intentional process, if we wan=
t to
stop being xenophobic, violent, vindictive and fearful.
Normally participative governmental systems
have founding constitutions that make the basic laws of the land explicit. =
They
have distinct governing instances, each with unique powers, the members of
which are chosen by some sort of popular mandate, habitually through electi=
ons.
There are pre-arranged means for communicating with these officials, and th=
ere
are legal courts through which their decisions can be challenged. Legal
democracies are complex structures, based on free debate, and held together
through both tradition and current law. The armed forces are restricted in
their internal repressive capacities, and are usually deployed only in fore=
ign
engagements. Local order is maintained by police forces, regularly controll=
ed
at a local level by elected officials. Legal change is possible in constitu=
tional
democracies through complex systems of debate and suffrage. When laws are
successfully challenged, they are no longer valid, such as the infamous
Jim-Crow laws in the southern states of the United States.[8] <=
span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:Roboto;mso-fareast-f=
ont-family:
Roboto;mso-bidi-font-family:Roboto;mso-ansi-language:EN-US'>
This legal complexity is considered to be a
protective system for guaranteeing popular sovereignty and preventing
take-overs by dictators, kings or small governing commissions. But it only
works if the population understands the need for these checks and balances.
When the population no longer understands the logic of balanced authority, =
then
the system becomes fragile and can be broken.
CONCLUSIONS
Accept the
challenge
In general, I believe that these propositio=
ns
obey, not only a desire to seek acceptable ways of living together. They
reflect a trend of thought that, although not new, suddenly has greater
relevance among current thinkers. It is clear that the existing patterns of
coexistence can be rethought.
We must accept this challenge. History and
philosophy must be revisited, and the choices they offer must be re-examine=
d.
Our societies are often determined by naked power relations, but it doesn't
have to be that way. Power is not deterministic, and communities have a wea=
lth
of experience to share in this regard.&nbs=
p;
We must return to social relations based on empathy (Cronick,
2024a), distributive justice and debate that is
founded upon culturally aware consciousness.
Where will the
changes come from?
There are a number of naturally occurring
sources for social change, some of which we have alluded to in these
reflections. There are many resources to support the idea of popular
sovereignty provided by concepts that come from history, philosophy, social
psychology and other sources.[9]
I have reviewed several ways of considering
participation and social awareness including Simmel’s (2016) idea that
usually people do not form exclusive allegiances with despotic power. They =
may
profess allegiance to, or vote for a potential tyrant, but they reserve the
possibility of dissent. This possibility may be liberating, and democratic
interests can make use of it. I have considered how normative values have
cultural and historical sources, and how they are open to discussion, altho=
ugh
some may be absolute in the Kantian sense of the “Categorical
Imperative”. All this is incorporated into the ongoing debate that ex=
ists
in our cultures. And finally, it all influences what kinds of government pe=
ople
will tolerate, given the liberty to choose. These debates are ongoing. It is
important for all citizens to understand their roles in government and power
structures, and for emerging leaders to listen to them.
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.
[1]=
<=
/span>This reminds =
us of
Moscovici's active minorities. We will deal with this topic later. <=
span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN-US'>
[2]=
Freire, P. (n=
.d.)
wrote about “problematization”, above all in relation to educat=
ion.
He used an almost Socratic method of questioning students about their lives=
and
their social reality in order to stimulate them “to find
themselves” and work together in elaborating alternatives to unaccept=
able
conditions.
[3]=
“When
nationalism implies a sharp distinction between insiders and outsiders, both
micro- and macro-level studies find that it correlates with conflict at hig=
her
rates. This category includes the distrusting and oppositional worldviews t=
hat
characterize aggressive citizens and leaders. [….] (Powers, 2024).
[4]=
A term taken=
from
Jacob William Cotton’s undergraduate thesis, “Brotherhood” in war: a
rhetorical approach to understanding the unity among soldiers (2017).
[5]=
The term com=
es
from Shakespeare’s play, Henry V (n.d.). The poet describes a small,
invading army like this:
“…=
;We
few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he to-day=
that
sheds his blood with me
Shall be my
brother; be he ne’er so vile…”
[6]=
It is perhap=
s a
masculine ideology but women have participated since the times of the Anato=
lian
Amazon warriors.
[7]=
Serge Moscovi=
ci
coined the phrase “active minorities” to describe individuals a=
nd
small groups that are the first to publicly challenge majority values, such=
as
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn did with his book. Gulag Archipelago.
[8]=
Jim Crow law=
s were
laws in the United States, enacted in the late nineteenth century, by the
southern state legislatures. These laws permitted racial segregation in all
public facilities.
[9]=
Resources
developed by social psychological research include: active minorities
(Moscovici, 1996), social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), Social learning
theory (Bandura, 1986), Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), Learned
helplessness (Seligman, 1975), Labeling theory of deviance (Becker, 1963), =
and
obedience (Milgram, 1963), Many of these references have been reviewed in
detail in Cronick, 2025d). These concepts=
are useful in community psychology as well.
LATAM Revista Latinoamericana de
Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades, Asunción, Paraguay.
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